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Know Better, Do Better? Do Higher Levels of Education Predict White Democrats’  
Antiracist Attitudes Relative to Action? 
ABSTRACT 
Conventional wisdom says that when you know better, you do better. Various theories of racism 
generally conform to this popular understanding, motivating colleges and businesses to invest in 
anti-bias trainings and other educational interventions. This study aims to make contestable the 
logic of ‘know better, do better’ as applied to racism through asking the question: does education 
predict white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes relative to their political action? Informed by 
Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance and Hersh’s (2017) concept of ‘political hobbyism,’ 
I propose that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, score higher on 
an ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than white Democrats with lower levels of education. I also propose 
that white Democrats with higher levels of education will score lower on a ‘Political Action’ scale. 
Finally, I propose that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, score 
higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale relative to the ’Political Action’ scale than white 
Democrats with lower levels of education. I test these hypotheses using the 2016 American 
National Election Studies (ANES) survey. The results show that education has a complicated and 
somewhat contradictory effect on white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes, political action, and 


















Conventional wisdom says that when you know better, you do better. Early theories of 
racism generally conform to this popular understanding. Early theorists used terms like “dogma” 
(Benedict 1945), “set of beliefs” (van den Berge 1967) and “doctrine” (Schaefer 1990) to 
describe racism as a “purely ideological phenomenon” characterized by prejudice (Bonilla-Silva, 
1996:465). The implicit solution to an ideological problem is simple: education. If racism is 
understood as a type of ‘bad knowing,’ then correcting that knowing should be racism’s silver 
bullet.  
This logic does not begin and end in the Academy; diversity trainings in schools and in 
workplaces, efforts to promote antiracism in curriculum, and discussion groups hosted by various 
organizations and institutions all reflect a belief in the value of education. Certainly, education 
matters. For example, research suggests that classroom knowledge can help build connections 
between the past and present in a way that positively affects antiracist attitudes (Griffen and 
Bollen 2009). But the theoretical link connecting education, antiracist attitudes, and political 
action is too often assumed rather than the site of earnest scholarly inquiry. Sociology is a 
discipline uniquely positioned to critically examine taken-for-granted truths. As such, 
sociologists have a responsibility to the public to meaningfully question education as the default 
response to racism. What use is the theoretical insight that education might influence antiracism 
if education’s impact on antiracist attitudes and action are not explicitly defined? 
This study aims, in its small way, to make contestable the belief that knowing better 
means doing better. It does so through examining attitudes and action separately and relative to 
one another. This study focuses on whites’ antiracist attitudes and action, based on the belief that 
whites harbor particular investment in and responsibility for the persistence of racial hierarchy. I 
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focus on white Democrats because racial attitudes in the United States are partisan. Eighty-eight 
percent of white Democrats support Black Lives Matter in September 2020 relative to 16% of 
white Republicans (Pew Research Center, Thomas & Horowitz: 2020). Most Joe Biden 
supporters (59%) agree with the statement: “white people benefit a great deal from advantages in 
society that Black people do not have,” while most Trump supporters (95%) disagree (Pew 
Research Center 2020). White Democrats’ relatively high levels of support for antiracist ideas 
make them an opportune demographic for testing the relationship between attitudes and action.  
This study asks: does education predict white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes relative to their 
political action? Informed by Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Ignorance and Hersh’s (2017) concept 
of “political hobbyism,” I formed three hypotheses:  
1. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than white Democrats with lower levels of 
education.  
2. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score lower on the ’Political Action’ scale than white Democrats with lower levels of 
education.  
3. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale relative to the ’Political Action’ scale 
than white Democrats with lower levels of education.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The maxim ‘know better, do better’ has long dominated scholarship on whites’ racial 
cognition and praxis. Even in the post-Civil Rights era, as support shifted away from “purely 
ideological” theories of racism, faith remained in the sequence of ‘knowing’ then ‘doing.’ First, I 
show how the legacy of ideological theories of racism live on in Color Blind Theory (CBT), 
perhaps the most dominant critical theory of contemporary racism. Second, I show how 
ignorance scholars, and particularly Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance (TRI), resist 
the pull of ‘know better, do better.’ Finally, I show how Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Ignorance 
and Hersh’s (2017) concept of ‘political hobbyism’ root whites’ racial knowing and political 
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action in “material ends” rather than “ideological rules,” casting doubt on the effectiveness of 
education as a response to racism (Mueller and Washington 2020:3).   
Racism as Ideology 
In the post-Civil Rights era, a growing number of theorists rejected “purely ideological” 
theories of racism (Sears 1988; Bobo Kluegel, and Smith 1997; McConahay 1986; Bonilla Silva 
1996). “Symbolic racism” (Sears 1988), “modern racism” (McConahay 1986), and “laissez-faire 
racism” (Bobo and Smith 1997) all “situate ideology” in a broader social, political, and economic 
context (Burke 2016:104). Modern theorists’ insight that structure and ideology are not opposing 
explanations for the persistence of racial inequality but rather are in some way mutually 
reinforcing has particular relevance to the question of education. If ideology and structure are 
codependent, would changing whites’ racial knowing through education in turn change social, 
political, and economic structures that produce racial inequality?  
Color Blind Theory (CBT) 
 Perhaps the most favored critical theory of contemporary racism, Color Blind Theory 
(CBT), seems to imply that the answer is yes. Bonilla-Silva (2001:26) describes colorblindness 
as a “racial ideology” made up of four “frames”: “abstract liberalism,” “naturalization,” “cultural 
racism,” and the “minimization of racism.” These frames serve as “set paths for interpreting 
information” (Bonilla-Silva 2001:26). Like earlier ideological theories of racism, colorblindness 
is theorized as a type of ‘bad knowing,’ but unlike earlier theories, that bad knowing is not 
thought of as “irrational” or “incorrect thinking” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:468). Instead, CBT sees 
racial ideology as “meaning in the service of power” (Bonilla-Silva 2001:26). Ideology is 
simultaneously born out of the material order and a mechanism for protecting it. Colorblindness 
sets the terms for how whites see the social world, and in so doing, what whites see. CBT, like 
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earlier theories, explains the persistence of racial inequality in ideological terms: “why is there 
racial inequality… in a ‘postracial’ society? Because people employ [racial ideology] to 
rationalize, legitimate, and thereby (re)produce a social order of stratification based on race” 
(Hughey et al. 2015:1350).1 CBT seems to argue that if whites had different “frames” (Bonilla-
Silva 2001:26) or “organizational map[s]” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:470) for understanding the social 
world, racial hierarchy would be significantly disrupted. While rejecting theories which describe 
racism as ‘purely ideological,’ CBT maintains a belief that whites knowing better would mean 
their doing better.  
Ignorance Scholars’ Criticism of CBT 
Not all scholars agree. For example, Mueller (2017) tests whether whites choose 
colorblindness “under conditions that make ignorance difficult” (220). Through analyzing white 
undergraduates’ essays on intergenerational wealth transmission, Mueller finds four “epistemic 
maneuvers” white students used to “bypass racial awareness” and “justify ongoing domination” 
(225). Mueller’s (2017) findings challenge Color Blind Theory’s assumption that if whites had 
different “frames” (Bonilla-Silva 2001:26) or “organizational map[s]” (Bonilla-Silva 1997:470) 
they would ‘know better’ and then ‘do better.’ Mueller’s (2017) study finds that even in the 
presence of antiracist frames, whites metabolize racial knowledge in such a way as to maintain 
their ideological attachments to white domination. This finding flies in the face of CBT and calls 
into question the effectiveness of education as a response to racism.   
Mueller’s (2017) finding that white ignorance ‘fights back’ joins a chorus of scholars 
(Mills 1997; Steyn 2012; Teeger 2015) who argue that ignorance is more nuanced than the 
 
1 1It is important to note that although this logic is reminiscent of early theories of racism, in that it emphasizes the 
role of ideology in maintaining racial hierarchy, CBT sees ideology as developing out of and in response to the 
social order. Therefore, it would be incorrect to equate CBT with “purely ideological” theories. CBT is similar, 
however, to the extent that it implies correcting ‘bad knowing’ as a central part of eliminating racial hierarchy. 
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absence of knowing (Mueller 2018:2). Although the western academic tradition is mostly 
dismissive of ignorance, equating it with irrationality or bad knowing, ignorance scholars argue 
that ignorance fulfills certain social, political, and economic functions. For example, in Steyn’s 
(2012) research on South Africans’ recollections of apartheid-era childhoods, ignorance is found 
to be a tool whites use to evade responsibility, protect psychological wellbeing, and maintain 
disproportionate ownership over material resources. Maly (2013) and Lavelle (2017) also find 
ignorance to be “functional” among whites who grew up in racially integrating neighborhoods in 
Chicago and among white Southerners respectively. In both cases, whites construct their 
memories consistent with a “white victim narrative” (Lavelle 2017:528). This narrative allows 
whites to maintain innocence during segregation and claim victim status during integration. 
These findings (Mueller 2017; Steyn 2012; Maly 2013; Lavelle 2017) together highlight that 
knowledge is not neutral. Despite the dominant western understanding that knowledge 
production is a process of logical deduction, these findings suggest that white racial knowing is 
built in the image of power. This is not a new idea. CBT makes a similar claim: that racial 
ideology is “meaning in the service of power” (Bonilla-Silva 2001:26). Ignorance scholars 
challenge CBT theorists by following that claim to its logical end.  
Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance 
If racial ideology is “in the service of power” can it also be power itself? CBT seems to 
argue yes: that the persistence of racial inequality is explained by whites recycling color blind 
frames. This logic seems to equate power with the mechanism for defending it. In other words, it 
is another ideological theory of racism, despite its claims otherwise. As Mueller and Washington 
(2020) point out, ideology cannot simultaneously be the mechanism through which racial 
inequality persists and racial inequality itself. Using Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial 
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Ignorance, Mueller and Washington (2020) argue that white cognition and praxis would be better 
characterized as “ends-based” (3). Relative to CBT, which describes whites’ racial cognition as 
dictated by certain “ideological rules,” or “frames” to use Bonilla-Silva’s term (2001:26), TRI 
“recalibrates that casual narrative” by grounding white cognition in “material ends” (Mueller and 
Washington 2020:3). More specifically, Mueller and Washington (2020) argue that whites think 
and act in accordance with the “twin convictions” that whiteness is “wonderful” and that it is 
“the ownership of the Earth forever and ever, amen!” (21). Knowing this casts further doubt on 
education as a formidable intervention. If white racial cognition and praxis is “ends-based,” it 
would logically follow that interventions should challenge the material order. Although certainly 
education can play a role in this, through “shap[ing] a broader citizenry dedicated to equity and 
justice,” there is reason to doubt that knowing better translates into doing better: “for all their 
[white students] learning, [Mueller and Washington] observed very little appetite let alone 
impulse toward antiracism” (20). It is this insight that most directly informs this study’s 
hypothesis: that while education might increase antiracist attitudes among whites (emphasis on 
might, see Mills 1997; Steyn 2012; Teeger 2015; Mueller 2017), it will also broaden the gap 
between attitudes and action. If white racial knowing and praxis is “rooted in material ends,” 
perhaps rather than investing in educational interventions, resources would be better directed 
towards abolishing the material conditions that make up whiteness. “After all,” Mueller and 
Washington (2020) say, “one cannot ‘confess’ or think their way into the undoing of privilege; 
creating structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges is the only thing that 
can deliver on that end” (23).  
White Political Action 
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Political action has a long history as a tool used by the people in their fight to establish 
more just and equitable social, political, and economic structures. In white supremacist societies 
like the United States, white people hold particular power over and privilege in these structures, 
and therefore have “an important role to play in creating social change” (Meleady and Vermue 
2018:307). For this reason, numerous scholars have taken up the question: what motivates 
whites’ political action?  
There is no scholarly consensus. Some studies (Selvanathan et al. 2018; Meleady and 
Vermue 2018) find that “positive intergroup contact” between white and Black people is 
positively associated with whites’ willingness to engage in “solidarity-based collective action” 
(Meleady and Vermue 2018:309). Other scholars identify ideological motivators (Drakulich et 
al. 2020; Cole 2020; Case 2012). Common across these theories of white political action is the 
importance of an external motivating factor. This observation might seem obvious. In general, 
the racial status quo materially benefits whites in white supremacist societies, so of course white 
engagement in political action must require some external motivator. Though obvious, this 
insight is socially and politically consequential. So much so that Hersh (2017) builds a theory of 
mass political behavior, called “political hobbyism,” to explain the civic behavior of a mostly 
white, male, and highly educated “comfortable class of citizens” (4).  
Political Hobbyism (2017) 
Political hobbyism refers to civic behavior undertaken not out of a sense of duty, but 
rather as a hobby (Hersh 2017). While some engage in politics out of necessity, to challenge 
policies which discriminate against them, for example, Hersh (2017) argues that a sizeable group 
of the American electorate- and a particularly sizable group of the Democratic base- engages 
with politics as if it were a sport. Political hobbyists engage in politics not out of a sense of duty, 
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or solidarity, but rather as a “leisure activity” (Hersh 2017:11). The casualness with which 
political hobbyists treat politics is reflected in the type of civic action they engage in. In a 2018 
survey, Hersh (2017) found that despite white people reporting having spent more time reading, 
talking, and thinking about politics than Black and Latino people, Black people and Latinos were 
twice as likely to volunteer for political organizations. This pattern in which white people engage 
with politics as an intellectual exercise rather than as a practice is only made more extreme 
among highly educated whites. Despite reporting spending more time on politics that other 
groups, highly educated whites overwhelmingly spend that time reading the news, discussing 
with others, and “contemplating politics alone” than volunteering for political organizations (less 
than 2 percent of the total time).  
Theory of Racial Ignorance (2020) and Political Hobbyism (2017) 
Hersh’s (2017) findings tell a story about highly educated whites that is mostly consistent 
with Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance. Whites’ civic engagement is 
disproportionately ideological, with very little time spent engaging in collective action, in the 
form of participating in social movements. Hersh (2017) suggests that this pattern is only made 
worse by education, because highly educated whites are more likely to have free time and to 
have a “daily experience” and “personal history” of “comfort” relative to other groups (23). 
Here, Hersh (2017) implies that highly educated whites’ mostly ineffective political behavior is 
not a consequence of poor political calculus. Rather, Hersh (2017) suggests, and Mueller’s 
(2020) theory supports, that highly educated whites’ political behavior is a reflection of their 
investment in an “anticipated future” (Tavory and Eliasoph 2013) in which they “maintain the 
spoils of racism without being racist” (Mueller and Washington 2020:3). In other words, for 
highly educated whites, knowing better can actually mean doing less. 
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Gaps in the Literature and Contributions of the Current Study 
In both the case of white antiracist attitudes and political action, there is considerable 
evidence that calls into question the effectiveness of educational interventions in meaningfully 
challenging racial hierarchy. Whites’ investments in “knowing badly” (Mueller and Washington 
2020:2) and treating politics as a sport (Hersh 2017) pose significant obstacles to whites playing 
a progressive role in affecting racial inequality. Despite these obstacles, the jury is not out on 
whether whites knowing better means their doing better. As previous studies skew qualitative, 
evidenced by the scholarship cited above, this quantitative study is needed. This study is also 
needed because it considers antiracist attitudes relative to action, whereas for too long, 
researchers have considered antiracist attitudes and action to be one and the same. Even studies 
which differentiate between attitudes and action often focus on one or the other. This means 
there is very little scholarship which considers attitudes relative to action. By design, this study 
addresses these oversights in the literature. Through operationalizing action as non-electoral 
civic engagement- signing petitions, joining protests, and donating money to a social or political 
organization- this study also meets that oversight in the literature on white action, which 
disproportionately emphasizes voting.  
METHODS 
Data Source and Sample 
 For this study, I used the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) data set. The 
unit of analysis was individual respondents. The ANES survey includes questions on, among 
other topics, Americans’ electoral participation and voting behavior as well as their attitudes on 
matters of public concern. The ANES survey’s focus on public opinion and political behavior 
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makes it an apt data set for this study: which examines white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes and 
political action.  
The 2016 ANES survey was conducted through two ‘modes’: a ‘face-to-face’ mode and 
an ‘internet’ mode. The ‘face-to-face’ mode sampled from a population of 222.6 million US 
citizens who were 18 years or older at the time of the survey and who lived in the 48 contiguous 
states of the US or in DC. The ‘internet’ mode sampled from a population of 224.1 million US 
citizens who were 18 years or older at the time of the survey and living in the 50 US states or 
DC. The sample for the ‘face-to-face’ mode was a multi-stage stratified cluster sample, and for 
the ‘internet’ mode, the sample was a random draw with equal probability for selection.  
The 2016 ANES survey was also conducted in two waves (pre- and post-election). 
Participants were first interviewed between September 7th and November 7th 2016 (pre-election), 
then again between November 9th and January 8th 2017 (post-election). In-person interviews 
were conducted by trained interviewers after an initial screening process. Respondents were 
compensated with $5 in cash initially, then $25 or $50 depending on the challenge of reaching 
respondents in that area. Sometimes respondents in areas with low response rates were 
compensated $100. Online surveys were first introduced through mail, in which would-be 
respondents were asked to visit the survey’s website. The initial online survey included a 
screening instrument that randomly assigned one US adult from the household access to the 
ANES survey. Internet respondents were compensated with $40 or $80, depending on response 
rates. The pre-election survey included 1,181 face-to-face respondents and 3,090 internet 
respondents, for a total sample size of 4,271 respondents. The re-interview rate on the post-
election survey was 90%, leaving the 2016 ANES survey with a total sample size of 3,843 
participants. After deleting missing cases and subsetting the data to include only white 
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Democrats (more on this under the sub-heading “Variables”), this study has a final sample size 
of 1,139 respondents. For more information on the ANES, including more information on the 
study design and sampling methods as well as the pre- and post-election questionnaires, 
reference the ANES website or codebook (for further information, go to: 
https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2016-time-series-study/).  
Variables 
 This study’s research question is: does education predict white Democrats’ antiracist 
attitudes relative to their political action? The broad sociological concepts that must be 
operationalized in order to address this question are race, political ideology, education, antiracist 
attitudes, political action, and antiracist attitudes relative to political action.  
White Democrats Subset 
 First, this study aims to explore the relationship between education, antiracist attitudes, 
and political action among white Democrats. To ensure that this study only includes respondents 
who identify both as white and as Democrats, I created a subset which excludes all respondents 
who identify with other racial groups and/or as Republicans. The ANES asks all respondents to 
self-identify with one of six racial groups: white; Black of African-American; American-Indian 
or Alaska Native; Asian; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; or Other. The ANES also asks 
respondents to self-identify with one of six political groups: “Strong Republican,” “Moderate 
Republican,” “Independent who leans Republican,” “Independent who leans Democrat,” 
“Moderate Democrat,” and “Strong Democrat.” This study only includes respondents who 
identified as “white” and respondents who identified as either “Independent who leans 
Democrat,” “Moderate Democrat,” or “Strong Democrat.”   
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Dependent Variables  
This study includes three dependent variables: antiracist attitudes, political action, and 
antiracist attitudes relative to political action. To operationalize each of these dependent 
variables, I constructed three scales: an ‘‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale,’ a ‘Political Action’ scale, 
and an ‘Antiracist Attitudes Relative to Political Action’ scale. First, I will describe the 
‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale and the ‘Political Action’ scale separately. Then, I will describe how 
they were both used to construct the ‘Antiracist Attitudes Relative to Political Action’ scale.  
Antiracist Attitude Scale 
Antiracist attitudes were operationalized using a “racial resentment” scale widely cited in 
the literature, most notably by Drakulich et al. (2020:11). While this scale operationalizes racial 
resentment, I argue that by reverse coding, this scale could also operationalize antiracist 
attitudes. Table 1 lists the variables included in the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale and the possible 
responses.   
**TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE** 
 As Table 1 shows, I recoded the second and third variables of the scale to reflect 
antiracist attitudes: namely, a receptiveness to structural rather than individualistic or cultural 
explanations of racial inequality (Bobo et al., 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2018). A Cronbach’s alpha test 
(.858) showed that the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale has high levels of internal consistency, and 
therefore high reliability.  
’Political Action’ scale 
This study’s second dependent variable is political action. Like antiracist attitudes, political 
action is also operationalized by a scale made up of four variables. Table 2 lists the variables 
included in the ‘Political Action’ scale and the possible responses.  
**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE** 
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As shown in Table 2, these variables were originally coded on a scale from 1 to 2, with 1 
meaning ‘have done this in the past 12 months’ and 2 meaning ‘have not done this in the past 12 
months.’ I recoded all variables so that having done the action in question is coded high. The 
results of a Cronbach’s alpha test (.524) showed that the ‘Political Action’ scale has moderate 
reliability .  
Antiracist Attitudes Minus ’Political Action’ scale 
 The final dependent variable in this study measures antiracist attitudes relative to political 
action. To operationalize antiracist attitudes relative to political action, I created a scale which 
subtracts the respondent’s score on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale minus their score on the 
‘Political Action’ scale. To create this scale, I first had to ensure that the antiracist attitudes and 
‘Political Action’ scales shared the same maximum value. To do this, I reviewed the maximum 
score of the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale and of the ‘Political Action’ scale and determined what 
factor they would each need to be multiplied by to become scales out of 100.  
For example, the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale consists of four variables with responses 
coded from 1 to 5. The maximum score possible on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale (before 
weighting) would be 20. This is relative to the ‘Political Action’ scale, which has a maximum 
score (before weighting) of 8. To ensure that each scale is measured out of 100, I multiplied 
scores on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale by 5 and scores on the ‘Political Action’ scale by 12.5.  
After ensuring that both scales shared a common maximum value, I created the antiracist 
attitudes relative to ‘Political Action’ scale by subtracting them from each other. For example, if 
R scored a 100 on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale (meaning they answered in the maximum 
antiracist direction for every question) but had not taken any of the political actions include in 
the ‘Political Action’ scale in the past twelve months (earning them a score of 4, because ‘have 
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not done this in the past 12 months’ is coded as 1) R would earn a score of 96 on the ‘antiracist 
attitudes minus political action’ scale.  
Independent Variable 
 This study’s main independent variable is education. The original education variable 
included 16 values, ranging from ‘less than 1st grade’ to ‘doctorate degree.’ I recoded the 
variable into categories ranging from ‘not a high school graduate’ to ‘doctoral degree,’ because 
there were very few cases in each category below a high school degree. The recoded education 
variable is ordinal, with higher levels of education coded high.  
Control Variable  
The control variables are age and liberalism. I recoded age to exclude the ‘older than 89’ 
category, recognizing that while the distance between 18 and 19 years old, for example, is one 
year, the distance between 88 and ‘older than 89’ could be any number of years. The recoded age 
variable ranges from 18 years old to 89 years old, with older people coded high. I also control for 
liberalism (within the subset of white Democrats). Liberalism consists of respondents who 
identified as either “Independent- Democrat,” “Moderate Democrat,” or “Strong Democrat” 
when describing their party identification. The liberalism variable is ordinal, with “Strong 
Democrat” coded high.  
FINDINGS 
Univariate  
Before considering the relationships between this study’s independent, dependent, and 
control variables, it can be helpful to first consider characteristics of the sample. Are the white 
Democrats included in this sample politically active? What is their average score on the 
KNOW BETTER, DO BETTER 
 
 17 
‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale? Questions like these can be best answered through univariate 
analysis, by looking at distributions and considering mean and median values.    
Consider the ‘Antiracist Attitudes Relative to Action’ scale, which measures the 
difference between a respondent’s score on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale minus their score on 
the ‘Political Action’ scale. Knowing the mean, median, and distribution of this variable could 
give insight into how white Democrats included in the sample prioritize knowing relative to 
doing.  
**INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE** 
The scale ranges from -67.5 (maximum action relative to antiracist attitude) to 50 (maximum 
antiracist attitude relative to action). The mean is 4.09 ± 21.091 and the median is 7.50 (see 
appendix for means table). Both the mean and median are positive, suggesting that most 
respondents score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than they do on the ’Political Action’ 
scale.  
**INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE** 
Figure 1 shows a slight positive skew, confirming that most respondents score higher on 
the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than on the action scale.  
Now turn to the antiracist attitudes and action scales respectively. Where does the sample 
fall with regard to these? The ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale had a mean of 67.45± 22.108 and a 
median of 70. Because the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale ranges from 20 to 100, a mean and median 
score near 70 suggests that most respondents held more antiracist attitudes than explicitly racist 
attitudes.  
**INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE** 
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 The action scale tells a different story: on a scale from 50 to 100, the mean score was 
63.37± 13.572 and the median score was 62.50.  
**INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE** 
The relatively low mean and median and the significant negative skew shown in Figure 3 suggest 
that most respondents engage in low levels of political action. So far, univariate analysis on the 
antiracist attitudes relative to ‘Political Action’ scale, the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale, and  the 
‘Political Action’ scale suggest that white Democrats are more antiracist in attitude than they are 
engaged in political action.  
Univariate analysis also provides clarity for this study’s independent variable: education. 
Figure 4 shows that the largest percentage of respondents in the sample have a Bachelor’s degree 
(24.8%) followed by some college (18.4%).  
**INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE** 
Figure 4 also shows that respondents whose highest degree of education is high school are in the 
minority, only accounting for 20.9% of the total sample.  
Bivariate  
 While univariate analysis provides insight into the sample, bivariate correlation tests 
relationships between variables. Table 3 shows that all the dependent, independent, and control 
variables had statistically significant relationships with one another at the .01 level except for: 
age and antiracist attitudes relative to action; liberalism and action; liberalism and education; and 
age and education.  
**INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE** 
The research question for this study is: does education predict antiracist attitudes relative to 
political action? Education, the main independent variable, was found to have a statistically 
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significant (p<.01) relationship with all three dependent variables. Education had a weak, 
positive relationship with antiracist attitudes relative to action (r=.212) and a slightly stronger 
positive, moderate relationship with both antiracist attitudes (r=.389) and political action (.304) 
respectively. 
Both of the control variables, liberalism and age, had statistically significant (p<.01) 
relationships with two of the three dependent variables. Liberalism had statistically significant 
and positive relationships with antiracist attitudes relative to political action (.098) and with 
antiracist attitudes (.121) alone. In both cases, the relationships were very weak. Liberalism had 
no statistically significant relationship with political action. Age had statistically significant and 
negative relationships with antiracist attitudes (-.115) and political action (-.113) but no 
statistically significant relationship with antiracist attitudes relative to political action.  Ages’ 
relationship with antiracist attitudes and political action were both weak.  
Multivariate  
 Perhaps the most powerful statistical analysis included in this study is multivariate 
regression. Like bivariate correlation, multivariate regression speaks to the relationships between 
variables. Unlike bivariate correlation, however, multivariate regression is able to test an 
independent variable’s relationship with a dependent variable net of other factors. In the context 
of this study, multivariate regression allows the researcher to test whether education net of the 
other variables included in this analysis predicts white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes relative to 
their political action. Before turning to the multivariate regression findings, recall this study’s 
three hypotheses:  
 
1. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than white Democrats with lower 
levels of education.  
KNOW BETTER, DO BETTER 
 
 20 
2. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score lower on the ‘Political Action’ scale than white Democrats with lower levels of 
education.  
3. I hypothesize that white Democrats with higher levels of education will, on average, 
score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale relative to the ‘Political Action’ scale 
than white Democrats with lower levels of education.  
With these hypotheses in mind, turn to Table 5.  
**INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE** 
The first hypothesis stated that white Democrats with higher levels of education would, 
on average, score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than white Democrats with lower 
levels of education. The multivariate regression findings support this hypothesis. The antiracist 
attitudes model was statistically significant (F=86.072), at the p < .01 level. Education was found 
to be a positive predictor (b=.388) of antiracist attitudes among white Democrats controlling for 
age and liberalism, followed by age (-.149) and liberalism (.141). Education, age, and liberalism 
accounted for 18.5% (R2=.185) of the variation in antiracist attitudes.  
The second hypothesis predicted that white Democrats with higher levels of education 
would score lower on the ‘Political Action’ scale than white Democrats with higher levels of 
education. This hypothesis was rejected. Education was found to be a statistically significant 
(F=46.815) and positive (b=.305) predictor of political action controlling for age and liberalism, 
followed by age (-.131). Consistent with the bivariate findings, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between liberalism and action. Education and age accounted for 11% (R2=.110) of 
the variation in political action. Though significant and positive, education was a weaker 
predictor of political action (b=.305) than it was for antiracist attitudes (b=.388). Education 
(along with age and liberalism) accounted for less of the variation in political action (R2=.110) 
than it did in antiracist attitudes (R2=.185).  
The third hypothesis stated that white Democrats with higher levels of education would, 
on average, score higher on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale than on the ‘Political Action’ scale. 
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This hypothesis was supported. Education was found to be a statistically significant (F=23.641) 
and positive (b=.211) predictor of antiracist attitudes relative to political action controlling for 
age and liberalism. Liberalism was also found to be a positive predictor of antiracist attitudes 
relative to political action (.107). Like in the bivariate correlation, age was found to be a 
nonsignificant predictor for this model. Of the three dependent variables, education was the 
worst predictor of antiracist attitudes relative to political action. Its standardized coefficient 
(b=.107) was weaker than it was for political action (b=.305) and for antiracist attitudes 
(b=.388). Education, age, and liberalism also accounted for less of the variation in antiracist 
attitudes relative to political action (5.9%) compared to the two other models.  
DISCUSSION 
 The results of this study generally support existing literature on white racial knowing and 
political action. The main finding, that higher levels of education predict higher scores on the 
‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale relative to the action scale, is consistent with both Mueller’s (2020) 
Theory of Ignorance and Hersh’s (2017) concept of political hobbyism.  
This is not, however, the whole story. This study’s unique contribution is in its finding 
that though education predicts a broader divide between antiracist attitudes and action, education 
also predicts higher scores on the antiracist attitude scale and the ’Political Action’ scale 
respectively.  
Education predicting higher scores on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale is not inconsistent 
with Hersh’s (2017) political hobbyism argument. In fact, Hersh (2017) argues that political 
hobbyists often are high information. This finding does at first seem to contrast with Mueller’s 
(2020) theory. While Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance suggests that “ignorance 
KNOW BETTER, DO BETTER 
 
 22 
fights back,” this study finds that higher levels of education do predict higher scores on the 
‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale.  
But as Mueller (2020) notes, “in a world looming with racial disparities, resistance, and 
counter-framed critiques from people of color,” white “racial reproduction” often requires 
“refashion[ing] new tools” in support of maintaining the racial status quo (233-234). Perhaps 
antiracist attitudes represent one such ‘refashioned tool,’ where learning about racism and 
professing antiracist attitudes allows whites a positive self-perception that, in turn, becomes an 
“insulating medium for the reproduction of a hierarchical racial order” (Steyn 2012:21). 
Possibilities like these make further research necessary, particularly on the function of antiracist 
attitudes for whites, to contextualize this study’s finding that higher levels of education predict 
higher scores on the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ scale.   
Education predicting higher rates of political action among white Democrats also 
presents inconsistencies with Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance. If whites think and 
act in accordance with maintaining the racial status quo, why do higher levels of education 
predict higher rates of political action, a form of resisting the status quo?  
This finding also challenges Hersh’s (2017) concept of political hobbyism- Hersh (2017) 
suggests that education is a conservative influence on political action, as it often reflects a certain 
level of comfort with ‘politics as usual.’ Finding that education has the opposite effect in this 
study is worth noting.  
Here again it is critical to note how political action was operationalized. The four 
variables which made up the ‘Political Action’ scale included: joining a protest, signing a 
petition, posting on social media about politics, and donating to a social or political organization. 
It is plausible that a respondent may score highly on all of these measures for participating in 
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political action around an issue other than racial justice. If this is the case, then this study’s 
finding that education predicts higher levels of political action among white Democrats is not in 
tension with Mueller’s (2020) Theory of Racial Ignorance, nor does it challenge Hersh’s (2017) 
concept of ‘political hobbyism.’  
Though not in tension with either of these theories, if whites choose to participate in 
political action that does not threaten the racial status quo, this is an interesting finding in and of 
itself. It contrasts with dominant understandings of white identity politics, which are often 
described as reactionary politics that aim to limit immigration or affect other policies whites 
perceive as ‘threatening’ white identity. If education does predict higher levels of white 
Democrats’ political participation, but that participation is designed to avoid challenging the 
racial status quo, this presents a type of white identity politics characterized by absence, or 
perhaps what Forman and Lewis (2006) called ‘apathy.’ Perhaps racial apathy is white identity 
politics on the left. Future research on highly educated, white Democrats and their political 
action is needed to better understand this finding.   
Another limitation of the study is the potential influence of time. Perhaps white 
Democrats’ antiracist attitudes, political action, and antiracist attitudes relative to political action 
change in response to contemporary events. For example, perhaps the period of sustained, Black-
led protest this past summer led to a surge in white Democrats’ political action, and perhaps at 
the same, white Democrats dedicated particular attention to racial learning. If this was the case, 
then it would suggest that factors beyond education, such as contemporary events, are at play in 
predicting white Democrats’ antiracist attitudes and political action. This was not measured in 
this study, and perhaps some of the variation currently being explained by education might 
actually be due to current events.  
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Despite the limitations of this study, the findings do welcome further analysis on the role 
of education in predicting whites’ antiracist attitudes and political action. More specifically, 
future research could critically examine the function of education for white Democrats beyond 
political action, paying particular attention to any ‘mediating effects’ education might have on 
white antiracism. Future research is also needed on white Democrats’ political action, and 
especially the role of apathy in Democratic white identity politics. Finally, future research could 
better engage the question of time, identifying consistencies between ‘racisms’ across time and 
space, as well as novel characteristics brought on by historical events or particular material 
conditions.  
CONCLUSION 
 This study set out to explore the question: if white Democrats know better, do they do 
better? Its findings paint a complicated picture. What is clear is that whites’ knowledge and 
political action are nuanced and sometimes contradictory in ways that mimic the deeply unjust 
world they simultaneously build and inhabit. For those who dream education to be the answer to 
white racism, this study offers little evidence. And to those who would argue for political action, 
this study offers reason to pause. In its refusal to concede to a single, simple truth, this study 
necessarily implicates alternative ways of thinking about white racial knowing and political 
action that meet the urgency of racial inequality. Imagining beyond ‘know better, do better’ frees 
up bolder, more committed responses around wealth redistribution and insurgency that no 
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Question Original Coding Recode 
'Irish, Italians, Jewish and many 
other minorities overcame prejudice 
and worked their way up. Blacks 
should do the same without any 
special favors.’ 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Agree’ to 5= 
‘Strongly Disagree’ 
N/A 
'Generations of slavery and 
discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for 
blacks to work their way out of the 
lower class.’ 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Agree’ to 
5= ‘Strongly Disagree’ 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 
5= ‘Strongly Agree’ 
'Over the past few years, blacks 
have gotten less than they deserve.’ 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Agree’ to 
5= ‘Strongly Disagree’ 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 
5= ‘Strongly Agree’ 
'It's really a matter of some people 
not trying hard enough; if blacks 
would only try harder, they could 
be just as well off as whites.' 
1-5; 
1= ‘Strongly Agree’ to 
5= ‘Strongly Disagree’ 
N/A 
Table 1. Variables and Coding for the ‘Antiracist Attitudes’ Scale  
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Question Original Coding Recode 
During the past 12 months, have 
you joined a protest march, rally, or 
demonstration?  
 
1= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
1= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
During the past 12 months, have 
you signed a petition on the Internet 
or a paper about a political or social 
issue?  
 
1= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months 
1= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
During the past 12 months, have 
you ever posted a message on 
Facebook or Twitter about a 
political issue?  
 
1= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
1= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
Not counting a religious 
organization, during the past 12 
months, have you given money to 
any other organization concerned 
with a political or social issue?  
 
1= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
1= ‘Have not done this in 
the past 12 months’ 
2= ‘Have done this in the 
past 12 months’ 
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Table 3. Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Antiracist Attitudes 







Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median S.D. 
Anti-Racist Attitude Scale 20.00 100.00 67.45 70.00 22.108 
Political Action Scale 50.00 100.00 63.37 62.50 13.572 
Anti-Racist Attitudes Relative to Action      -67.50 50.00 4.09 7.50 21.091 
Liberalism 1.00 3.00 2.141 2.00 .828 
Education 1.00 7.00 4.12 4.00 1.643 
Age 18.00 89.00 48.77 50.00 17.541 





Table 4. Bivariate Correlations Between Antiracist Attitudes Relative to 








































Anti-Racist Attitudes Scale  
 
.380* .121* .389* -.115*  
‘Political Action’ scale 
 
  .045 .304* -.113*  
Liberalism 
 
   .023 .192*  
Education 
 
    .018  
*p < .01 
N-1,139 
      




Table 5. Regression of Education, Liberalism, and Age on Antiracist Attitudes 












Minus Action b 
 
Anti-Racist 




Education .211* .388* .305* 
Age -.072 -.149* -.131* 
Liberalism .107* .141* .063 
F (3, 1135) 23.641* 86.072* 46.815* 
R2  .059 .185 .110 
    *p < .01, n= 1,139 
































































Figure 4. Bar Graph of Education 
 
  
 
